First, the deployment is a proactive step to safeguard Uganda’s northern border. South Sudan’s instability, marked by renewed tensions between President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar, threatens to spill over into Uganda. Past conflicts have driven waves of refugees southward over 1.1 million South Sudanese have sought refuge in Uganda since 2013, straining resources and infrastructure.
By bolstering Kiir’s government and securing Juba, the UPDF helps prevent a descent into civil war that could flood Uganda with even more displaced people. Stability in South Sudan is not just a neighborly favor; it’s a national security imperative.
South Sudan is a vital market for Ugandan exports, from agricultural goods to manufactured products, over 150,000 Ugandan traders operate there, and South Sudan is the largest importer of Ugandan goods, generating significant revenue. The two nations have pursued joint projects, like building a modern market in Juba and planning a railroad linking Juba to northern Uganda, a key border crossing, has historically been disrupted by conflict, costing Ugandan traders millions.
A stable Juba ensures these economic lifelines remain open, preserving jobs and revenue at home. Moreover, Uganda’s construction firms and service providers often find lucrative contracts in South Sudan’s post-conflict recovery phases opportunities that vanish when violence flares. The UPDF’s presence could pave the way for a more predictable business environment.
This move reinforces Uganda’s stature as a regional heavyweight. Under President Yoweri Museveni, Uganda has long positioned itself as a stabilizer in East Africa, from fighting the LRA alongside South Sudan to mediating conflicts elsewhere. Supporting Kiir a longtime ally cements this reputation and strengthens bilateral ties rooted in a shared security pact. General Muhoozi Kainerugaba’s declaration that an attack on Kiir is an attack on Uganda underscores this commitment, signaling to other regional players that Kampala is a force to be reckoned with. This projection of power could enhance Uganda’s leverage in bodies like the African Union or IGAD, where influence matters.
For South Sudan itself, the UPDF’s deployment offers a chance to avert disaster. The country’s fragile peace, barely held together since the 2018 agreement, teeters as clashes in Upper Nile and political brinkmanship escalate. Uganda’s “technical and support units,” as Juba now calls them, provide Kiir’s forces with the backbone needed to deter militias like the White Army and maintain order. Critics argue this props up an embattled regime, but the alternative a power vacuum or renewed war would be far worse for South Sudan’s weary population.
Of course, there are risks. Uganda could get bogged down in a conflict it can’t easily exit, as it did in 2013-2016, or alienate Machar’s supporters, complicating future mediation efforts. Yet the UPDF’s experience and Museveni’s deft regional maneuvering suggest Kampala knows how to calibrate its involvement. Parliamentary approval on March 14, 2025, also lends legitimacy, addressing domestic concerns about overreach.
Uganda’s deployment interests is less about altruism and more about the Pan-Africanism strategy with an aim of stabilizing a neighbor. For a region too often defined by fragility, this intervention might just tip the scales toward peace and prosperity. That’s a gamble worth taking.
The author is a student of communication at Cavendish University
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