Kawempe North by election is over. Elias Luyimbazi Nalukoola of the National Unity Platform (NUP) took it. He reclaimed the Seat left by the late Mohammed Ssegirinya. But Faridah Nambi candidature has brought a new shift in Kampala City political dynamics.
In the grand picture of Kampala’s political theatre, President Museveni and his NRM party, put up a spirited fight. The result NUP got in Kawempe North can actually further diminish in the upcoming general elections.
The true winners of the Kawempe North by-election on March 13, 2025, I submit, were President Yoweri Museveni and Prime Minister Robinah Nabbanja, who led the onslaught to reduce Elias Luyimbazi Nalukoola’s chances of scoring more than 20,000 votes.
I base my argument on voter turnout, opposition fragmentation, and the strategic gains of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), even in defeat.
First, consider the stark drop in voter turnout. In the 2021 general election, Muhammad Ssegirinya, the late NUP MP, won Kawempe North with 41,197 votes, reflecting robust opposition support in this urban Kampala stronghold. Fast forward to 2025, and Nalukoola secured the seat with just 17,764 votes—a 57% decline from Ssegirinya’s haul. Total votes cast in the by-election were 27,596 out of 28,002 ballots issued, a moderate turnout compared to the over 55,000 votes cast in 2021 when Ssegirinya triumphed.
This low turnout, roughly half of the previous election’s, suggests voter apathy or suppression, both of which play into the NRM’s hands. Gen Museveni and PM Nabbanja, leveraging state machinery and security forces, may have indirectly engineered this disengagement — used tactics to dampen opposition enthusiasm.
A smaller, less energized electorate inherently favors the ruling party’s ability to mobilize its core base, as seen with Faridah Nambi’s 8,593 votes, a modest uptick from the NRM’s 6,946 in 2021. It means NRM gained in its numbers, yet, NUP declined.
Second, the opposition’s fragmentation is another proof bolstering NRM cause. The by-election featured ten candidates, including NUP’s Nalukoola, NRM’s Nambi, and representatives from the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), Democratic Party (DP), and People’s Progressive Party (PPP), alongside independents. Yet, beyond Nalukoola and Nambi, the rest—Sadat Mukiibi (FDC), Henry Kasacca (DP), Ismail Musiitwa (PPP), and five independents—performed dismally, collectively splitting a mere 1,239 votes. In 2021, opposition-leaning candidates, including independent Sulaiman Kidandala (7,512 votes), amassed over 51,000 votes combined. This time, the opposition vote collapsed to Nalukoola’s 17,764, with no other party or independent breaking even 500 votes.
FDC, DP, and PPP, once relevant players, were effectively absent, leaving NUP as the sole opposition force. Other opposition parties were a no-show including CP, ANT, and pressure groups like DA or PFF.
Nalukoola’s win was a shadow of Ssegirinya’s landslide, suggesting NUP’s grip weakened. Museveni and Nabbanja capitalized on this disarray, consolidating NRM’s position as the only cohesive alternative, even if it didn’t clinch the seat.
Third, Nambi’s 8,593 votes—over double Nalukoola’s margin of victory (9,171)—signal a strategic win for Museveni and Nabbanja. The NRM gained roughly 1,600 votes from 2021, a 24% increase, while NUP’s vote share plummeted. Museveni’s personal campaigning on March 11, 2025, and Nabbanja’s relentless rallies in Bwaise, Kazo-Angola, and Kyebando framed Nambi as a conduit to government resources, a message that resonated with some despite the loss. Posts on X noted this numerical gain, with one user arguing, “When you look at numbers, it’s a win to NRM… Regardless the loss we gained.” The NRM’s ability to close the gap in an opposition bastion, coupled with Museveni’s focus on long-term control rather than a single by-election, underscores their triumph. Nalukoola’s 64% of valid votes pales against Ssegirinya’s 82% in 2021, hinting at a hollow victory for NUP.
Finally, the broader context cements Museveni and Nabbanja as winners. This wasn’t about Nalukoola’s seat but about testing NRM’s pull and stifling NUP’s momentum ahead of 2026. The heavy security deployment and reported terror, as one X user put it, ensured “the one with support” (NUP) didn’t “win comfortably.” Museveni’s team toasted not to Nambi’s loss but to an untouched presidency, as another post observed. Low turnout and a fractured opposition diluted NUP’s urban dominance, proving that Museveni and Nabbanja could weather a defeat while tightening their grip on the political narrative.
In conclusion, Nalukoola may have taken the seat, but Museveni and Nabbanja won the war. The low turnout, opposition’s collapse, NRM’s gains, and the preservation of ruling-party dominance reveal a calculated victory beneath the surface loss. Kawempe North wasn’t a triumph of NUP’s resilience but a testament to Museveni and Nabbanja’s ability to bend the game to their favor, even when the scoreboard says otherwise.
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